Generational Contextualization in Russia

In the latest Journal of International Affairs (Spring/Summer 2010), pp. 1-18, Dr. Jeffrey Mankoff wrote “Generational Change and the Future of U.S.-Russian Relations.” He is the associate director of International Security Studies at Yale University. In this article, he explores the potential influence the first post-Soviet generation will have on Russia’s self-identity. What is truly insightful, though, is the useful categories he defines for Russian generations.

For Americans, it has almost become second-nature to see the categorization of generations as Baby-boomers or busters, generation X, or post-moderns. These categories, and their respective American perspectives, do not apply to their Russian counterparts. I often hear American volunteers quip that “Russian youth are so much more mature than our youth” or “they seem so stoic and stiff; they need to learn to relax a little.” What many Americans do not understand is that although Russians do have their own ways of relaxing and “letting go,” they view life quite differently than the American of the same age.

Although Mankoff’s essay is not about sociological demographics per se, he finds the following categories useful in the discussion about Russia’s political perspectives:

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1. Shestdesyatniki (children of the 1960s): They are now in their 70s and 80s (born in the 1930s). These would include people like Mikhail Gorbachev. They “found their political identity during the period of cautious liberalization undertaken by Nikita Khrushchev” (p. 5). These were the guys who sought the rebuilding of Russia and explored new ideas to do so. Although these are also the folks who long for what they once had, they still express openness to Western dialogue instead of Cold War tactics.

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2. Oligarchs (generation of capitalists in the 1990s): They are now in their 50s (born in the 1940s). These are the ones who “seized many of the USSR’s more valuable assets during the breakdown of state control” (p. 5). This is the generation currently in charge of most private assets in Russia today and generally believed that the more they could personally acquire from a dying state, the better. This generation sees western relations as a means to an end, namely financial.

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3.  Reformers (generation of Putin & Medvedev): Now in their late 30s & early 40s (born in the 1960s). Putin was actually born in 1952 while Medvedev was born in 1965. Medvedev’s age group was in their twenties during the fall of communism. This generation has high hopes for Russia as a reemerging world power. It is this group that is seeking to fight both internal corruption and external western influence in Russia’s emerging identity.

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4.  Modern Youth (born in the late 1980s and 1990s): “tend to believe that their actions can make a difference both in their own lives and the life of the country as a whole” (p. 6). They have a high degree of political activism, a positive view of the oligarchs as successful heroes, willing to travel and live abroad, and nevertheless trust Putin’s brand of politics to reawaken Russia’s role in the coming world order. They are “generally unsympathetic to the West and increasingly beholden to a narrow conception of Russian nationalism” (p. 13).

The question that stands out, then, is how can a presentation of the gospel be contextualized for each of these age-groups? Although there are naturally some variations and diversity with each category, how could a holistic plan of salvation be shared that shows both eternal atonement and current transformation? I would be interesting in your ideas and experiences.